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Abstract 
Suspicious activity reporting has been a crucial part of anti-money laundering systems. Financial transactions are considered 
suspicious when they deviate from the regular behavior of their customers. Money launderers pay special attention to keep their 
transactions as normal as possible to disguise their illicit nature. This may deceive the classical deviation based statistical 
methods for finding anomalies. This study presents an approach, called SARDBN (Suspicious Activity Reporting using Dynamic 
Bayesian Network), that employs a combination of clustering and dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) to identify anomalies in 
sequence of transactions. SARDBN applies DBN to capture patterns in a customer’s monthly transactional sequences as well as 
to compute an anomaly index called AIRE (Anomaly Index using Rank and Entropy). AIRE measures the degree of anomaly in a 
transaction and is compared against a pre-defined threshold to mark the transaction as normal or suspicious. The presented 
approach is tested on a real dataset of more than 8 million banking transactions and has shown promising results. 
Keywords: Anomaly detection; clustering; suspicious financial transactions; suspicious activity reporting; dynamic Bayesian network; anti-
money-laundering  
1. Introduction 
    Identification of suspicious financial transactions is a crucial part of anti-money laundering (AML) systems. 
Money laundering broadly refers to the process of taking illegally obtained money and inducting it in the cycle of 
financial system in a manner that disguises its origin and makes it appear to be legitimate. There are various forms 
of money laundering. One common method is to decompose one large transaction into large number of medium-to-
small-sized transactions so that they appear normal and do not come under the radar of any monitoring entity. 
Certain other methods focus on keeping the illegal money continuously in flow by performing various operations 
(like investment in a business venture, sales and purchase of instruments or donations to charity organizations, etc). 
The purpose is to keep this money distant from its actual source and making its tracing extremely difficult.  
    Suspicious activity reporting (SAR) normally works on the basic principle that any transaction that does not 
comply with the normal behaviour of a customer or similar group of customers is anomalous and can be considered 
suspicious. Various anomaly detection techniques have been suggested in the literature to uncover these suspicious 
financial transactions [1-8] . Most of the AML approaches perform clustering to identify anomalies. Few techniques 
employ artificial neural networks (ANN) [3], decision trees [7] and support vector machine [8] to identify suspicious 
transactions. Hidden Markov model (HMM) [9] and Probability suffix tree (PST) [4] based approaches look for 
sequential anomalies. Sudjianto et al. [10], Patcha et al. [11] and Chandola et al.[12] present comprehensive surveys 
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of various anomaly detection methods, used in different application domains, and assess their relative strength or 
potential weaknesses. 
This paper presents a novel approach, called SARDBN (Suspicious Activity Reporting using Dynamic Bayesian 
Network), that employs a hybrid model of distance based clustering and dynamic Bayesian network to identify 
anomalies in a sequence of transactions. The core idea behind the approach is that the overall monthly transactions 
of a customer establish a defined pattern. This pattern closely matches among customers of similar characteristics 
and can be captured in the form of a probabilistic temporal model. Any deviation from this pattern is marked as 
suspicious. To improve accuracy of the model and to minimize false alerts, the paper suggests an anomaly scoring 
metric, termed AIRE (Anomaly Index using Rank and Entropy), that measures the degree of anomaly in each 
incoming transaction. The transaction is marked as suspicious only when its AIRE value exceeds a certain threshold. 
Unlike other AML approaches that work on aggregated summaries of customer transactions, like average amount or 
frequency, SARDBN identifies abnormalities in sequence of transactions. A transaction that apparently looks 
normal, with respect to the aggregates, may found to be anomalous when considering the particular sequence that it 
followed. The entropy based scoring mechanism reduces false positives, without compromising on true positives, 
and ensures that high anomalies are raised only in situations when the model has enough conclusive evidences to 
support them. The data set used in the experiment has more than 8 million banking transactions and the results show 
good predictive accuracy for SARDBN. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents SARDBN, while Section 3 provides the 
experimental design and results. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper and provides directions for future research. 
2. SARDBN 
This section explains SARDBN that is designed to identify anomalies in sequence of transactions. The approach 
can be divided into three major steps: 1) Clustering, 2) Learning DBN and 3) Anomaly Detection. These steps have 
been further explained below:  
2.1. Clustering 
      As different groups of customers exhibit different transactional pattern, the first step performed by SARDBN is 
to form clusters of customers that exhibit similar transactional pattern. The similarity in the transactional behaviour 
is assessed by a customer’s average monthly credit and debit amounts, frequency of credit and debit transactions, 
and delay in two consecutive transactions. The quality of cluster is determined by inter-cluster and intra-cluster 
distances. The initial clustering of customers may have profound impact on the final performance of DBN – the 
more cohesive the clusters the better the predictive accuracy of the corresponding DBNs.  
2.2. Learning Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN)      
      Once clustering is performed, the next step is to learn the parameters of a DBN for each cluster. The structure of 
these DBNs can vary in different scenarios and is devised with the aid of subject matter experts. For this study, the 
three variables under consideration are transaction amount (TxnAmount), mode of transaction (TxnMode) (e.g. 
cheque withdrawal/deposit, ATM withdrawal, salary transfer, POS payment, bank draft), and period of transaction 
(TxnPeriod) (i.e. start/middle/end of month).  These three variables serve as random variables in a BN and are 
Fig. 1. (a) BN (b) DBN (c) Unrolled DBN, for financial transaction
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connected as depicted in Fig.12 (a). When considering sequence of transactions and assuming dependencies within 
this sequence, the standard BN is converted into a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) where each transaction 
belongs to a different time slice. Fig. 1(b) shows a complete DBN of order two, while Fig.1 (c) gives the unrolled 
version of this DBN for three time slices. Once the structure of a DBN is finalized, its prior and conditional 
probabilities are learned from the dataset. For the purpose of this experiment, DBNs of order one and two are 
discussed in the sequel although the order can be adjusted as per the degree of interrelationship between 
transactions. 
2.3. Anomaly Detection 
After learning DBN for each cluster, the model is ready to be used for anomaly detection. During this phase, each 
incoming transaction, along with its last n transactions, is passed through the DBN of its respective cluster and its 
amount and mode are predicted. These predictions are ranked on the basis of their posterior probabilities. The one 
with the highest probability is assigned a rank of one, the second highest as two and so on. An anomaly index, AIRE 
(Anomaly Index using Rank and Entropy) has been developed that make use of these ranks and the corresponding 
entropy: 
         AIREi = ( r - 1 + e *(.5 +.5k - r) )/(k-1)                                                                                               (1) 
Where r and e are rank and entropy of predicted variable and k represents total number of states. The total 
anomaly score of a transaction is the weighted sum of AIRE value of each predicted attribute. 
        AIRE = 6i(wi * AIREi) (2) 
Where i represents each random variable predicted from DBN and wi and AIREi are the corresponding weight 
(assigned subjectively) and anomaly score.  
The computed AIRE value is compared against a given threshold to mark the transaction as normal or suspicious. 
Lower rank represents better compliance of transaction with the past behaviour and hence a low anomaly. While 
higher rank implies poor compliance and thus high anomaly. Entropy value shows conclusiveness of the model to  
report anomaly with lower entropy representing better conclusiveness and vice versa. As entropy increases, 
probability distribution loses its decisiveness; making AIRE converging to the middle value, that is, 0.5. Fig.2 shows 
the shape of AIRE as a function of rank and entropy while Fig.3 depicts its application using a sequence of three 
transactions along with the corresponding instantiated DBN.  
Fig. 3 - Instantiated DBN for a sequence of three transactions 
2 Figs. 1 and 3 are drawn using GeNIe that can be downloaded from http://genie.sis.pitt.edu
Fig. 2 – The surface showing AIRE as function of rank and entropy
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Table 1 summarizes the anomaly detection phase of SARDBN. 
Table 1- SARDBN - Anomaly detection 
Given Txn, C, DBN, V, W, DBN, n, W:
where Txn = Incoming transaction 
 C = customer of Txn,  DBN = DBN of the cluster the customer C belongs to. 
           V = Set of variables to be predicted, W = Set of weights for each variable to be predicted 
      n = Order of DBN, W = Threshold 
1. Load last n transactions (Tx0 – Txn-1) of customer C. 
2. For i = 0 to n-1 
a. Instantiate random variables on timeslice ti with the attributes of transaction Txi
3. Perform inference in the DBN. 
4. For each viV
a. Sort the states of vi in descending order of their posterior probabilities. 
b. Let r = Rank of state that matches with the actual value of Txn
          p = Probability of state that matches with the actual value of Txn
          k = Total number of states of vi
c. Calculate normalized entropy ei of vi as:  e = - 6k p log2(p)/log2(k)
d. Calculate AIREi of vi as: AIREi = ( r - 1 + e*(.5 +.5k - r) )/(k-1)
5. Calculate total anomaly AIRE of transaction Txn as: AIRE = 6i wi * Ai
6. If AIRE >  W, Mark Txn as anomalous Else,  Mark Txn as normal
3. Experimentation and Results 
     SARDBN is tested on a dataset containing banking transactions of non-corporate customers.  The dataset 
contains around 100 thousands customers incurring 8.2 million transactions over the period of a year. The following 
steps are performed to identify anomalies using SARDBN: 
     Data preprocessing: Data preprocessing is performed to clean the dataset and discard some of the transactions 
and account types that have either been inactive throughout the year or are unlikely to be involved in money 
laundering. 
     Data segmentation: After preprocessing, the whole dataset is divided into two parts: Training and Testing. 
Training part comprises of transaction from January till October and is used for clustering and parameter learning of 
the DBN. Test data includes transactions during November and December and is used to analyze the model for 
prediction and anomaly detection.   
     Clustering: Training data is clustered on the basis of the average monthly credit/debit amount and the average 
frequency of transactions for each customer. Fuzzy c-means algorithm [13] is used to form four clusters of 
customers.  
     Amount Discretization: Amounts range from very small to very large values and follow different variances in 
each cluster. For each cluster, amounts are discretized using unsupervised k-bins discretization method [14]. 
     Model Learning: For experimental purposes, DBN of order one and two are tested in this paper. Model learning 
includes extracting prior and conditional probabilities from training dataset. 
    Testing: For the DBN of order two, all sequences of three consecutive transactions of the same account are loaded 
from test dataset and are passed through the DBN to extract their rank and entropy. These two parameters are then 
used to calculate AIRE for each transaction. The AIRE value is matched against a given threshold to mark the 
transaction as normal or suspicious. The process is repeated for the DBN of order one, with sequences of two 
consecutive transactions. Table 2 summarizes accuracy of SARDBN to predict TxnAmount and TxnMode. The 
readings are taken from a total of 120000 transactions with 30000 transactions belonging to each cluster. The results 
show good accuracy of SARDBN in predicting the mode and amount of an incoming transaction. The transactions 
that deviate extensively from the learned model have higher AIRE values and are considered anomalous. Table 3 
gives number of anomalous transactions for different threshold values while Figure 4 plots a graph of number of 
anomalies against different threshold values. As the threshold increases, number of anomalies decreases and vice 
versa. The exact value of threshold may vary from situation to situation and can be decided by the subject matter 
expert.   
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4. Conclusion 
Identification of suspicious financial transactions to unhide money-laundering activities has always been a complex 
problem. This complexity can be attributed to the vagueness in the criteria of a transaction being suspicious, the 
consciousness of money-launderers to keep their moves unobserved, and the difficulty in validating the results 
obtained. This study employed a hybrid model of distance based clustering and dynamic Bayesian networks, called 
SARDBN, to identify anomalies in sequence of transactions. An anomaly scoring metric called AIRE was also 
presented that quantifies the degree of anomaly in each incoming transaction. SARDBN has been tested on a huge 
dataset of financial transactions and is shown to have promising results. However, a thorough comparison of 
SARDBN with some of the existing AML approaches can shed more light on the pros and cons of each method and 
is an area of future research. 
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